



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

the most vicious element in Mr. Kidd's clever book, the assumption that reason is essentially unsocial. One cannot avoid a suspicion that, as it is his fear of Pantheism that is at the root of his speculative dualism, so here it is his justifiable jealousy of a purely naturalistic Ethics which is the obstacle in the way of his acceptance of a thorough-going idealism. The danger to the religious view of morality is, of course, all the other way. If the individual will is shut up within itself and can only enter into communion with other wills symbolically, how are we to conceive of its relation to the Divine? Can the individual soul partake of this also only through symbols, and if so, what meaning can we attach to a symbol of that of which we have no real knowledge? Mr. D'Arcy quotes Scripture. The root of the present matter is contained in the scriptural question "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Mr. D'Arcy has shown himself an appreciative student of Green's "*Prolegomena*." To the present writer much, both of the metaphysics and the psychology of that great work, seems to possess little more than an historical interest, but the Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation are as fresh and vital to-day as when they were delivered in 1879. A book like the present shows how important it is, in the attempt to carry on and develop idealistic philosophy in England, to supplement the more individualistic view of the *Prolegomena* with the doctrine of the general will as developed in the Lectures.

I regret that my limits do not permit me to do justice to the admirable style and still more admirable spirit of this hand-book by quotations, and that this review has been mainly critical. The book itself is chiefly constructive, and has suggestions for the student of ethics at whatever stage of advancement.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY. By J. S. Mackenzie, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895. Pp. 454.

The doctrine that Mr. D'Arcy rejects is made the head of the corner by Professor Mackenzie in his able work on Social Philosophy. Throughout two brilliant chapters (III. and IV.) he exerts

himself to prove that society is organic in the sense that the individual can only be understood as a member of a system of wills whose mutual relations constitute the essence of each. Society is necessary to the individual not only τοῦ ξῆν ἐνεκα, but also τοῦ ἐν ξῆν ἐνεκα, and in this latter connection again, not only in the sense that "the realization of any one individual's highest life is impossible without the co-operation of others, but even that the realization of other lives is an essential element, indeed, *the* essential element in the realization of our own."

The success of his method in working out this doctrine is sufficiently indicated in the review of the first edition which appeared in this JOURNAL in April, 1892. It will be sufficient, here, to note the changes the author has made in his second edition. Besides one or two notes and a running reference to important works on sociology which have appeared since the date of publication, the chief addition consists in a short appendix to Chapter IV. upon the Theory of Value. Professor Mackenzie here emphasizes the distinction he elsewhere draws between objects which have value for a conscious being and which may be anything and the subjective appreciation of their value in what we call pleasure. While agreeing in the main with his view on this subject, I confess that there are some points in it which are still left obscure. The distinction above stated between that to which we assign value (in other words, the object of desire), and the subjective sign of that value (in other words, the pleasure we feel in obtaining it), would probably be accepted by most non-hedonistic readers. But when Professor Mackenzie substitutes as a synonym for the usual "sign of value" the phrase, "sense of value," and proceeds on the basis of this definition to the further contention that feeling is implicit judgment (see p. 242), many readers will probably feel that they are on more dangerous ground. They may be willing to admit that feeling, in the sense of the "indifferentiated continuum" of primitive experience, is implicit judgment, but this does not, of course, commit them to the view that feeling as such, and it is of that we are here speaking, is merely an elementary form of intellection.

It might have been better if Mr. Mackenzie had recast this whole section of his book instead of simply adding a note to it as the result of further reflection. The whole point, however, is of great importance, perhaps, also in spite of so much that has recently been written upon it of great obscurity, and we are grateful even for the

few hints that are here thrown out as an addition to an otherwise trenchant and valuable criticism of the various forms of Hedonism. Externally, the new edition is all that could be desired as a handy text-book for the student of political philosophy.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

LONDON.

DIE GESELLSCHAFTS-ORDNUNG UND IHRE NATÜRLICHEN GRUNDLAGEN. Entwurf einer Social-Anthropologie zum Gebrauch für alle Gebildeten, die sich mit socialen Fragen befassen. Von Otto Ammon, Mit 5 Abbildungen im Text. Jena: Gustav Fischer. Pp. viii., 408.

The fundamental theoretic thoughts of this book can be given in a few words. The true object of the social order is the selection of the best, the most capable. On this depends every possibility of progress, every possibility of solving the increasing problems of civilization, of even preventing the fall of existing civilization. Perhaps the thought in its universality will nowhere arouse opposition. The extremest socialism would scarcely be inclined to believe that every man was capable of *any* performance, provided only that it was imposed upon him for the sake of society and with a corresponding livelihood assured to him. Socialism also is not inclined to relinquish the intelligent control of production, the continuation of inventive activity, and creative intellectual work; on the contrary, its advocates promise that the powers of mankind will have an entirely new development when the burden is lifted that the capitalistic *régime* of to-day has laid upon the masses, when talent no longer starves on the hard crust of misery, when freedom from the humiliating and hindering struggle with want gives each one room for his individual development.

The principal object of the work before us is to prove that this view of the existing order of society and this form of hope for the future is a dangerous delusion not in harmony with the natural laws of social life. The author attempts to show that the existing social order of civilized peoples possesses, as the product of a development of several thousand years and of a slow selection of forces, mechanical instrumentalities for selection, which work with at least comparative perfection, and that it would be an attempt of hopeless folly to change fundamentally the order of society, and to create artificially new instrumentalities for selection, with the idea of winning by means of them better results. Ammon considers